Take a deep breath … and then start panicking
by ROBERT BECKHUSEN
It’s not every day one of Europe’s largest economies votes to pull itself out of the European Union, the British prime minister announces his resignation and serious questions erupt regarding the future of the Western political order.
But fortunately for NATO and the British military, it’s not time to panic … yet. The military implications of Brexit will not set in overnight, and Britain has a backup plan.
However, there could be profound consequences for the alliance and the British military over the long term — some of them negative.
For one, NATO is responsible for Europe’s collective defense, not the European Union. The United Kingdom will remain one of Europe’s largest economies and will continue to wield outsized global influence due to its permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.
Nor does leaving preclude Britain from participating in the E.U.’s military missions, such as chasing pirates off the Horn of Africa.
The British economy has tanked, but Britain will survive. The actual process of withdrawing from the European Union is also exacerbated by the entangling of European and British case law, which will take years to sort out.
Parliament must ratify the referendum for it go into force — and what remains of the British-European relationship years from now is a mystery. But there’s no doubt that Brexit (if it happens) could have major consequences for British foreign and military policy.
A June briefing paper from the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense and security research organization, described a a possible withdrawal from the European Union as “significant a shift in national strategy as the country’s decision in the late 1960s to withdraw from bases East of Suez.”
That’s a big, sweeping and once-in-a-generation shift.
It was evident at the time. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United Kingdom withdrew its military from East Asia and the Middle East to focus on countering the Soviet army in Europe. This period coincided with the Troubles in Northern Ireland, where British Army troops deployed beginning in 1969.
Britain joined the European Union’s predecessor organization in 1973. In short, Britain’s growing military ties with Europe were inexorably bound with growing economic and political ties.
Those ties shaped the British military.
The Royal Air Force scrapped its long-range Avro Vulcan strike bomber, which wasn’t needed to defend the homeland from a Soviet invasion. Britain put off building new aircraft carriers, but developed Trafalgar-class attack submarines to hunt Russian subs in the North Atlantic.
Britain’s Tornado fighter jets are also a product of the 1970s, built by a German-Italian-British consortium and designed specifically to fight Soviet forces in Europe.
The Falklands War served as a brief interlude in 1982. But beginning in the 1990s, Britain would shift to a more internationalist posture, fighting wars in Iraq and later Afghanistan, where Britain still keeps 450 troops in an advisory role.
Today, British warplanes and advisers are involved in the war with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The U.K. military is increasingly involved in Africa.
In short, the British military is less focused on Europe, and is more globalist, than it was during the Cold War.
So in an irony for Brexit’s most isolationist supporters, one possibility is that a post-E.U. Britain might increase its role in NATO to make up for its declining influence in European capitals. Especially now that European governments worry about Russia’s military build-up.
“The U.K. might find that the extent of its commitment to European defense would be one of its few bargaining chips as it entered a period of tough negotiations on the terms of its future economic engagement with its E.U. neighbors,” Malcom Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute wrote.
The outcomes of the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw in July are likely to further constrain the U.K.’s room for maneuver, committing the U.K. to invest in deployments and capabilities whose main role will be to contribute to deterrence of Russia. New crises in Europe and its neighborhood (for example in the Balkans or Africa) could also increase immediate demands on U.K. capabilities, especially in cases where the U.S. makes it clear that it expects Europe to take the lead.
In these circumstances, as Europe’s most capable military power, the U.K. could not easily stand aside from the European consensus without significant risk to its reputation as a reliable NATO partner.
Nor can a resurgence of security concerns closer to home be ruled out.
But that’s just one possibility. What happens now is fundamentally uncertain.
The Brexit vote reflected deep divisions in British politics — between class, age and geography. In Northern Ireland, Catholic Republicans were far more pro-European than Protestant Unionists, and a reduction in cross-border trade and migration “could undermine what is already a fragile political settlement in Belfast,” Chalmers wrote.
Scotland, which only recently (and narrowly) voted down an independence referendum, supported staying in the European Union by 62 percent. Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said that “it is … a statement of the obvious that the option of a second [independence] referendum must be on the table, and it is on the table.”
Britain bases its four Vanguard-class nuclear submarines — armed with nuclear Trident missiles — at HMNB Clyde in Faslane, Scotland. The separatist Scottish National Party, which has a majority in the country’s parliament, opposes basing nuclear weapons in Scotland.
“The big elephant in the room is Trident,” Iain Ballantyne of Warships International Fleet Review told War Is Boring. “If Scotland breaks away, then the Trident boats and SSNs will be kicked out of Scotland.”
Relocating the submarines and their Trident missiles will be expensive and time consuming. The Royal Navy refits the Vanguards at Devonport Dockyard in Plymouth, England, but the base would require costly refits if Clyde ceases to be an option.
British warship construction is also concentrated in Scotland, although there is a smaller facility at Appledore in North Devon, England.
But relocating may not be feasible if the British economy plunges into a long-term recession. Same goes for a military strategy that calls for greater involvement with NATO. There simply won’t be enough cash to afford it.
Brexit will have consequences for European arms companies which do business with the United States, too. Namely, a decline in the value of the euro and the pound — in relation to the dollar — will make American products more expensive.
Marcus Weisgerber of DefenseOne noted this would increase the price of the already eye-poppingly expensive F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which the Netherlands, Britain, Denmark and Italy are all buying.
Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-35, depends on European buyers to stay in the program and keep costs down. The same is true for British military companies which rely on partnerships with European companies. The Eurofighter Typhoon, for instance, is jointly built by BAE Systems in England, Airbus in France and Alenia Aermacchi in Italy.
But resetting defense deals is not the end of the world.
Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute described a post-Brexit United Kingdom as possibly becoming a “more populous version of Canada, retaining an independent foreign and security policy, clearly differentiated from that of the giant power next door, even while being sensitive to the need to maximize its access to the international top table on some issues, for example European relations with Russia.”
However, the ripple effects throughout the rest of Europe could upend this optimistic scenario. A Britain ridden with recession and internal turmoil could turn inward — making it harder for NATO to cooperate on deterring Russia. Brexit could also add to NATO’s existing troubles at presenting a common face on policy.
Not to mention that it will surely invigorate nationalist and populist parties elsewhere. “The European integration project may not be doomed,” Chalmers wrote. “But it is wounded.”